
Approaches to Nuclear Energy
- Published:
- May 9, 2010
- Reading time:
- 22 min read
- Category:
- Essay
Episode 9, "Attraction and Expenditure Considerations", examines investment attraction and costs, their effect on the timely delivery of vital projects, and the escalation of project costs.
Published in Jordan's Al-Sabeel newspaper on 9 May 2010.
The media are currently discussing cost estimates for some nuclear projects whose tenders have been awarded or are about to be awarded. These include: 1) a project to build a plant producing 2,000 tonnes of yellowcake a year, said to cost 600 million dollars; 2) the experimental nuclear reactor project, said to have been awarded for 130 million dollars; and 3) a feasibility study for generating electricity and desalinating water with nuclear reactors, awarded at a cost of 11 million dollars. These costs are, in truth, high, and the situation could be remedied by following approaches that better reflect reality and are more closely tied to national needs. The details follow.
First: The uranium project tender
In the seventh episode we discussed the early beginnings of this project. I add here that the project had been halted from 1992 to 2001. In 2001 I was transferred from the Ministry of Energy to the Natural Resources Authority, and we succeeded in attracting international interest in this project and placing it high on the government's list of priorities. In 2005 the government formed a technical committee, which I had the honour of chairing, to study detailed offers submitted by two foreign companies to exploit this resource, starting with the central region of the Kingdom (Siwaqa and its surroundings). The committee unanimously recommended rejecting both offers and issuing an international tender (inviting bids by sealed envelope).
Meanwhile, the Atomic Energy Commission took the initiative from the Natural Resources Authority and obtained a government decision to form a new committee to select a qualified international consultant to help choose the best company to exploit the uranium. I had the honour of representing the Ministry of Energy and the Natural Resources Authority (the uranium project management) on this committee. However, things went differently: the project was assigned to the first company, and negotiations were held with it to build nuclear power plants for electricity generation in addition to producing uranium. In truth, this approach calls for close examination for the following reasons:
- It contravenes the government decision assigning the government committee to select a qualified consultant to help the government choose the right company.
- It is inconsistent with the first government committee's recommendation to issue an open international tender to attract detailed offers.
- It prevents us from benefiting from competition between companies to submit better offers through an open, sealed-bid tender.
- The companies were ranked on the basis of an initial self-assessment, not on detailed offers covering technical, financial and legal aspects, as happens in major tenders.
For these reasons, we called for adherence to the terms of reference issued by the government to the committee and for objectivity and transparency. My membership of the committee was then given to another person, I was retired, and the project was awarded to the company ranked "first". Finally, what we had warned against happened: the media reported the intention to contract with that company to build a yellowcake plant at a cost of 600 million dollars, in exchange for 50% of the net profits going to the state. In truth, this approach needs a thorough review, for the following reasons:
- Uranium reserves are still being verified, and the possibility of exploiting them has not yet been proven. The feasibility and environmental impact studies awarded to the aforementioned company have not yet been completed, and talk of cost and revenue estimates at this stage may not reflect the real costs and revenues once the two studies are completed.
- The technology for producing this material is very simple, much like that of producing cement from rock. It is no more than collecting rocks, crushing them, and then roasting them with alkaline or acidic agents so that the uranium leaches out of them. Such a plant can be built and operated with national effort and local funding.
- It does not involve radiation risks requiring high costs for extensive radiation protection measures, because natural uranium is a slowly decaying material (its half-life is 4.5 billion years).
- The product, uranium ore concentrate (or yellowcake), is a raw material in the nuclear fuel cycle. In other words, it is not subject to strict international restrictions, as manufactured and enriched fuel is, that would require paying a high price for binding long-term contracts with the company to guarantee marketing the product through it or with its help.
- The offers submitted to the Natural Resources Authority (by six international companies) included costs for this facility of between 38 million and 150 million dollars (about four times less than the company's offer).
- The state's expected revenues from the project will be around 30 million dinars a year, and 450 million dinars over the project's lifetime, which is estimated (on the basis of the reserves proven so far) at about 15 years, not billions of dinars as announced in the media.
- These revenues are likely to erode considerably because of the expected fall in uranium prices in light of the global financial crisis, which has pushed major countries to liquidate their arsenals of nuclear weapons and fissile materials, such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium, one tonne of which is enough to produce 40 tonnes of enriched fuel. This trend is expected to continue because of the deepening crisis in Europe and America and the growing pressure on medium-sized and small countries to do the same.
- A significant part of the project's (already small) revenues will be consumed by removing radioactive dust, treating industrial wastewater, protecting groundwater sources, rehabilitating the site, servicing capital, and accounting for changes in currency value and exchange rates, among other things. These allocations (for direct expenses) may be no less than 20–30% of the project's total annual revenues, and certainly more once uncertainty factors and indirect expenses are taken into account.
- There is a promising new method for producing yellowcake, "heap leaching", which is simpler and cheaper than conventional mills and very low in cost (only millions of dollars). It is a serious alternative in countries similar to Jordan in their limited resources, scarce water and low uranium concentrations in the rocks. It is also useful if one wishes to proceed slowly and deliberately to establish an "in-depth culture" and avoid the uncertainty factors we discussed in previous episodes.
- The 50% share to be given to the government is very low in light of other offers reaching 80% (given the above considerations, especially the simplicity of the technology used and the ease of marketing the product).
From the above, it is clear how weak the assumptions are on which this approach to yellowcake production was built (if there is any approach at all, since it is still at the idea stage), and how far the government's profit margin may erode, possibly becoming negative (taking into account indirect costs and uncertainty factors). The optimal approach requires obtaining competitive offers (through an open tender), negotiating with the shortlisted company within a cost range of 100–150 million dollars, and maximising Jordan's share of the net annual revenues to no less than 80%.
Second: The experimental (or research) nuclear reactor project tender
Like the previous project, this project has its roots in a number of studies, systematic plans and activities that I submitted to the government and that we implemented on the ground at different times. The most important of these are:
- A study entitled "The Need for a National Nuclear Centre for Research and Training", submitted in 1982 to the Ministry of Industry and Trade, which was then responsible for the nuclear energy file.
- The "National Strategy for Nuclear Energy" project, submitted to the government in the same year, which set out the activities and projects required for Jordan to enter the nuclear age in a well-studied manner.
- A feasibility study for "Establishing a Jordanian Nuclear Centre for Research and Training with a 5-Megawatt Experimental Nuclear Reactor", submitted in 1985 to the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources following its establishment and the transfer of nuclear energy responsibilities to it.
- The "Jordanian Nuclear Programme for 1986–2000" project, which included all nuclear activities expected during that period, among them the nuclear reactor project.
- The "First Five-Year Plan for Nuclear Energy, 1987–1992" project, in which the nuclear reactor project was the central pillar.
- The "National Centre for Nuclear Technology Research, 1989" project, which focused on establishing the nuclear centre and the reactor at the Higher Council for Science and Technology.
- The "Second Nuclear Energy Plan, 1993–2000" project, which included establishing the permanent headquarters of the Atomic Energy Commission, the laboratories of the Jordanian Nuclear Centre and the experimental reactor in Shafa Badran, after it proved impossible to establish the centre under the umbrella of the Higher Council for Science and Technology (the heads of department of the Nuclear Energy Directorate at the time, which had expanded to keep pace with the rapid development of the work, took part with me in it).
All these studies, plans, programmes and projects were approved by the government and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Regarding the nuclear reactor project (the most important of them), it was agreed with the Agency that the project would be implemented with local funding and scientific and technical support from the Agency, and that it would be programmed for completion in three stages:
Stage one: Establishing radiochemistry and radiation physics laboratories, which are essential for gaining experience and maximising the benefit of the reactor. This stage was implemented successfully, and we were able to give a number of staff advanced training, which led the Agency to approve the move to the next stage and to allocate the necessary funds in its budget for 1995–1996.
Stage two: Establishing a subcritical assembly for training before building the reactor itself, which is a large source of neutrons. We manufactured the assembly locally, and the Agency sent an expert to inspect it and verify its suitability for its purpose and its radiological safety. The expert recommended approving the assembly and transferring its allocations to fund stage three, which was scheduled for completion in 1997–1999.
Stage three: Building the reactor itself, the hot cells and the laboratories. The Agency allocated 2.4 million dollars to it, and the rest (about the same amount) was to be provided by the Jordanian government, in line with the Agency's usual practice, in the form of land, buildings and local furnishings. Work was under way to equip the centre with a TRIGA-2 nuclear reactor, the best type of experimental nuclear reactor, especially for poor countries, as it can be operated at a low power of 100 kilowatts most of the time and, when needed (for advanced scientific research), its power can be raised within a very short time (a fraction of a second) to 1 megawatt or more. This spares us the high costs of buying a reactor that operates continuously at high power. The expert came on 22 March 1997 to discuss the justifications for this request. Two weeks before his arrival (on 7 March 1997), I was moved from my position (Director of Nuclear Energy and Project Director) to the post of adviser, and the project was suspended. In 2000 I was sent to Vienna to attend the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency; the resumption of the reactor project was discussed, and it was agreed with the Agency to reschedule implementation for 2001–2002. Once again I was transferred, from the Ministry of Energy to the Natural Resources Authority, and work on the project was suspended. When the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency came to Amman in 2007, we took the opportunity to propose reviving the project. He expressed the Agency's readiness to consider it, but the matter was not followed up. The Agency officially pointed out that the constant changes had prevented the project from being completed on schedule. In truth, I did not feel that what was happening was an official policy, but rather the kind of harmful ready-made ideas and disruptive interference in the work by those who sought to take over this effort. The project gave way to a project to import a used nuclear accelerator that had been retired in its country of origin, and which has still not been completed, even though nearly five years have passed since its target date. I have pointed to these interventions several times in newspapers and on various websites [1].
The point of this story, too, is that there was an institutional effort and a well-crafted national plan for the experimental reactor project, and we have the experience and knowledge of its various aspects that make us pause at what was announced about awarding a tender to build an experimental nuclear reactor for 130 million dollars in direct costs. Add to this that the new reactor will be built on the campus of the Jordan University of Science and Technology, which already has many laboratories and much infrastructure that should save a great deal of cost. Even if we ignore all these considerations and assume that the project costs 130 million dollars, the decisive question is: What is the economic and scientific justification for paying this exorbitant cost? What will we gain in return? To understand and answer this question, we note that an experimental reactor project has three justifications:
The first justification: Training engineers to work in the proposed nuclear power plant programme. In truth, this programme is still at the study stage, as we mentioned, and building this huge number of nuclear power plants, which require extensive and costly training, may not prove feasible. Even if the nuclear programme were approved in all its magnitude, the experimental reactor would not replace training abroad, because nuclear power plants require higher training standards, which usually take place (and indeed must take place) at specialised facilities owned by the companies supplying the nuclear power plants, at their expense and under their responsibility.
The second justification: Meeting the Kingdom's needs for the radioactive isotopes used in medicine. In truth, the Kingdom's consumption of these isotopes does not exceed one million dollars a year, which does not justify paying such high costs, especially since producing these materials requires equipment and laboratories other than the reactor, which make up the largest part of their production cost and limit the reactor's benefit to only tens of thousands of dinars (the cost of irradiation). Moreover, the synchrotron project, which also cost large sums and is still unused, could be used to produce these materials; and the power plants planned for construction are hundreds of times stronger and better for producing these materials (if they are built)!
The third justification: Producing neutron beams for scientific research. This justification also loses part of its importance when we know that a new line for producing such radiation could be added at the Allan synchrotron. We previously worked, with support from the International Atomic Energy Agency, on establishing a line for producing neutrons from the University of Jordan's accelerator, and that project could simply be revived. The point is that even this small, old accelerator (at the University of Jordan) could be refurbished and used to produce neutrons at a small cost (tens of thousands of dinars) instead of spending tens of millions to build a reactor of this size. Add to this that each of the planned nuclear power plants is a neutron source one million to one hundred million times stronger than the proposed experimental reactor!
From the above, it is clear to us:
- How much harm was caused by delaying this vital project, which we had planned to complete at the right time, long before the construction of any nuclear power plant, with funding from the International Atomic Energy Agency and under its supervision, in a way that would have saved more than one hundred million dollars.
- That the project at this cost is not economically, or even scientifically, justified, and will continue to incur losses (foreseen and unexpected).
- That even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that it is justified at this cost, it would have been more sensible to follow an implementation approach that provides the minimum research requirements and equipment at the beginning and then adds new requirements as our experience and needs develop over time, which is the method followed in all countries of the world. This would avoid committing to the full amount now and bearing the cost of capital until long into the future.
- That even if we set aside all the previous considerations, the duplication of similar projects (such as the reactor under discussion, the many nuclear power plants, the small nuclear accelerator and the synchrotron) makes them overshadow one another. In other words, an abundance of large productive capacities will remain unused (in each of these projects) because the experimental reactor is used instead of them, which runs counter to sound resource management, especially in a small country that needs every resource.
- That the matter requires a new approach consisting of two options:
Option one: Reconsidering the project within a cost of around 10–15 million dollars, and planning the implementation stages according to need to avoid paying excess costs in advance, before they are needed (even if the contracted company has to be compensated because of this change).
Option two: Returning to the International Atomic Energy Agency to resume the old project it supported. In this case, there is no harm in negotiating with the company awarded the tender to buy the reactor from it (as a form of compensation), which is a practice followed by the Agency (the country concerned chooses the supplier). In this case, funding from the Jordanian side would be limited to 3–5 million dollars for buildings and equipment.
Third: The nuclear power plant feasibility study project
Although the cost of this tender is relatively small (11 million dollars), it is a continuation of the same approaches that lead to inflated spending, for the following reasons:
- This work is consultancy work, in which the state or the authority concerned should play the more important role, not the other way round.
- It does not involve technologies or specialised expertise exclusive to the party or parties supplying this type of service.
- As a country, as institutions and as individuals, we have the specialised (accumulated and long-standing) expertise that enables us to maximise the national contribution to the required service. Our interest in using nuclear power plants began in 1982 within the strategy mentioned earlier; continued in 1983 in the paper "Energy and the Nuclear Option" and in 1985 in the paper "Nuclear Energy in Jordan"; and in 1988 in a paper entitled "Requirements for a Jordanian Nuclear Power Plant for Electricity Generation". These studies, which I also had the honour of preparing, resulted in the establishment of several uranium projects and of the electricity programme planning project implemented in cooperation between the Ministry of Energy and the Jordan Electricity Authority. This produced a clear vision, within the strategy of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, for entering the era of nuclear electricity generation in a sound and well-studied way, before the recent rapid developments that followed 2008.
The point of this story, too, is that there was a well-founded national effort, and that nuclear electricity generation was a core component of the strategy of the ministry primarily responsible for this sector in the Kingdom. It would have been better to adopt it to avoid the fog that has hung over the subject for two years, which has been clearly reflected in contradictory statements (in the media) about the nature of the project and its components, in terms of:
- The number of nuclear reactors and power plants we wish to acquire (1, 2, 3 or 4...).
- The size of the reactors (700, 800 or 1,000 megawatts...).
- The cost of the plants (1,000, 2,000 or 2,500 million dollars per plant?).
- The type of use (for base load, for self-sufficiency, or for export).
- The type of fuel (natural or enriched).
- The site (Aqaba, Wadi Araba, Al-Khirbeh Al-Samra... or elsewhere).
- The source of cooling water (a closed cycle, the enclosed waters of Aqaba, or the uncertain Two Seas Canal).
- The purposes of the hoped-for nuclear power plants (generating electricity and water, or electricity only, and from where).
- Spent fuel (will we export it or store it locally, is there a country that would accept importing it, and at what price?).
- How will we solve the problem of the thousands of tonnes of radioactive waste that this huge programme will generate?
- Will we export a clean commodity, electricity, to others while we keep the dangerous radioactive waste and live with its terrifying burden for thousands of years to come?
- To what extent does each component of the nuclear programme (reactors, power plants and the fuel cycle) contribute to the concentration of radioactive pollution under normal operating conditions in the Kingdom and across borders?
- Do we have a plan to deal with devastating nuclear accidents, God forbid? And how do neighbouring countries view this issue?
- Where will we find tens of billions of dinars for a project fraught with risks, in which the incentives for attracting capital are fading?
- Which is more beneficial for the state: investing in alternative energy sources, or embarking on an experiment shrouded in ambiguity and in risks that increase (in an almost exponential pattern) as the number and size of the programme's components increase...?
And many other big questions that should have been answered in advance (on our side) to form the terms of reference governing the work of the company awarded the study tender, rather than problems we wait for the company to study and answer on our behalf. A lack of clarity on them would push any consultancy asked to prepare a feasibility study for a vague project to ask for double the cost. It would have been better not to bypass the role of the Ministry of Energy and its long-standing expertise, in order to save time, reduce costs, and rationalise implementation in line with our real needs... and perhaps it is not yet too late!
In truth, with these hasty perceptions and ideas, which we have been discussing for months, we are paying the costs four times over. First, because we did not seize the opportunities to implement projects on time, long enough in advance to gain experience before embarking on major projects; and the loss here is incalculable. Second, because we are losing direct support and legitimacy from the International Atomic Energy Agency, which are required in all cases, whether or not the projects are supported by it. Third, because we are bypassing the efforts of national institutions that spanned three full decades and cost the state large sums in manpower, training and software, all of which have gone to waste. And fourth, because we are paying exorbitant costs for hesitation and lack of clarity. [1] On 10 December 2009, on the Ammon News website, in an article entitled "In Light of the Royal Letter of Designation to the New Government".