
Approaches to Nuclear Energy
- Published:
- June 16, 2010
- Reading time:
- 18 min read
- Category:
- Essay
Episode 10, "Considerations for a Methodology of Entering the Nuclear Age", examines the methodology for Jordan's entry into the nuclear age and the stages through which it has passed.
Published in Jordan's Al-Sabeel newspaper on 16 June 2010.
See: Jordanian nuclear programme, Wikipedia
To begin with, we say: there must be a sound methodology for entering the nuclear age. We showed in the previous episodes that what is repeated in the media and on satellite channels does not reflect a scientific methodology, but merely spur-of-the-moment ideas, in a field that tolerates no gambling. Because such a judgement requires a comparison, or measuring one case against another of the same kind, we will address the subject of "the methodology of Jordan's nuclear entry" across the three stages this experience has passed through:
The first stage: from 1980 to 1997
This stage (which I had the honour of initiating and leading) represents the foundational beginning of nuclear energy in Jordan. Despite scarce financial resources (no capital budget was allocated to nuclear energy until the final year), and despite the rarity of specialists and the small number of nuclear energy staff (who remained no more than the fingers of one hand for more than two-thirds of this stage), we achieved major accomplishments that led the International Atomic Energy Agency to adopt the Jordanian experience as "an example of achievement despite limited resources". The most important achievements of this stage were the following:
First: Planning and studies
Because introducing nuclear energy was a new subject, and because of its well-known sensitivities, we had to make a double effort to explain the idea, its objectives and its benefits. The work proceeded methodically, with progressively expanding planning; all components of the plans were implemented on schedule, and we often had to look for new ideas, study them and obtain official approval for them. The most important plans included the following:
- The National Strategy for Nuclear Energy.
- The Jordanian Nuclear Programme (1987–2000).
- The First Five-Year Plan for Nuclear Energy in Jordan (1987–1992).
- The Second Nuclear Energy Plan (1993–2000).
- Annual, quarterly and monthly plans.
- Dozens of scientific studies and feasibility studies, some of the most important of which we mentioned in the previous episode.
Jordan attained an advanced position in nuclear programme planning in the West Asia region, which is one of the reasons Jordan qualified to begin major radiation projects, including the research reactor, the commercial gamma irradiation unit project and the pilot uranium project.
Second: Legislation
Legislation is never more necessary and important than in the nuclear field. We paid great attention to regulation and legislation and succeeded in putting in place an advanced body of legislation in line with the latest principles of nuclear work issued by the competent international organisations. It comprised:
- Nuclear Energy Law No. 14 of 1987.
- The amended Law No. 29 of 2001.
- The Code of Practice for Radiation Work, which comprised several chapters: instructions for licensing radiation work; the nuclear and radiological emergency plan; instructions for radioactive decontamination; instructions for designing radiation shielding; instructions for transporting radioactive materials; and warning signs for radiation work areas. In addition, there were the Jordanian Radiation Atlas project and the project for modelling nuclear and radiological accidents.
I had the honour of drafting the law, the licensing instructions, the emergency plan and the last two research projects, and of taking part in preparing the other instructions. These efforts culminated in the following main results:
- The Agency considered Jordan's legislation the most recent and advanced in the Arab countries (given that the earlier Arab legislation in Egypt, Syria and Iraq was outdated, dating back to the time of the United Arab Republic).
- The Arab Atomic Energy Agency (headquartered in Tunis) adopted the Jordanian legislation, organised several Arab scientific events to present it, and published it in a volume that it circulated in 1989 and 1996.
- Our experience was transferred to a number of Arab countries, such as Yemen and Qatar.
Third: Human resources
Nuclear programmes require advanced and diverse training programmes in line with high international standards. In this field too we succeeded (despite limited resources, as mentioned earlier) in achieving very impressive results, the most important of which were:
- Qualifying 30 people at master's and doctoral level in nuclear engineering, nuclear medicine and nuclear systems engineering.
- Gradually increasing the number of nuclear energy staff from one person (the author) in 1980 to 40 people in 1997, and qualifying them in leadership programmes in their fields of work (nuclear engineering, medical physics, nuclear agriculture, etc.).
- Providing advanced training (at the second and third levels) abroad for more than 150 people from the relevant national institutions in various fields of nuclear energy (agriculture, industry, medicine, pharmacy, water, environment, minerals, primary and secondary energy sources, and others).
- Organising local training programmes (first level, in radiation protection) for about 2,734 people (doctors, engineers, physicists, technicians...) from various relevant institutions, and licensing them to work in the nuclear field.
- Encouraging and supporting local universities to establish programmes in medical and health physics.
- Concluding agreements with Jordanian universities to carry out research programmes in nuclear fields, complementing postgraduate programmes, to solve some problems related to radiation and the environment (I had the honour of proposing several research projects and helping to supervise them).
- Publishing a series of educational books and bulletins, including the Nuclear News bulletin (which I had the honour of launching and editing), and the book Nuclear Energy: Its Definition, Importance and Uses (which I also had the honour of writing for the Arab Atomic Energy Agency of the Arab League, headquartered in Tunis).
Fourth: Institutional structure
From the outset, we worked to establish an institutional structure for nuclear energy in Jordan. Despite the many constraints, and despite the newness of the idea, we succeeded in developing this structure in record time. The results included the following main achievements:
- Developing the administrative structure: from one person in 1980, to a Nuclear Energy Section in 1987, and a Nuclear Energy Directorate in 1989 (I had the honour of founding and leading this stage).
- Acquiring 120 dunums of land in Shafa Badran and beginning, in 1996, construction on it of the permanent buildings of the Nuclear Energy Commission (later the Atomic Energy Commission) and the nuclear energy laboratories (with an initial built-up area of nearly 6,000 square metres).
- Acquiring 30 dunums in the Siwaqa area and building a radioactive waste facility on it.
- Obtaining the Agency's qualification to acquire a research nuclear reactor (of an advanced type), completing the first and second stages of the project, and beginning the third stage, as we explained in the previous episode.
- Obtaining a government decision in 1996 to establish an independent nuclear energy authority, and beginning the constitutional stages for approving its legislation.
Fifth: Supporting and developing national institutions
From the beginning, we were firmly convinced that, as a country, we had to focus more on applied projects that help improve the means of production and maximise income in all development sectors, and that the nuclear energy administration had to act as an attractor of nuclear technologies and a catalyst encouraging the relevant institutions in the Kingdom to use these technologies and to establish their own nuclear institutional structures, which would, over time, become able to continue working on their own. We succeeded in spreading nuclear techniques to all ministries and institutions in the Kingdom and placing them at the top of the institutions' priorities. Among the results of this effort were:
- Qualifying about 2,000 workplaces (companies, laboratories, radiology clinics, hospitals, universities...) and licensing them to work with radiation sources, including helping to design radiation shielding and to keep, store and properly use radiation sources.
- Establishing quality control programmes (central and institutional) in the public and private sectors to improve the use of radioactive materials and radiation equipment, especially in the medical field.
- Helping institutions draw up their own nuclear and radiological emergency plans, to feed into the general national plan implemented by the Nuclear Energy Directorate (I had the honour of drawing up the national plan, as mentioned earlier, and of heading the national nuclear emergency team, which included task forces from all state institutions working in the nuclear field and in supporting fields such as civil defence, public security, the armed forces and other service institutions, from 1991, when the government adopted the plan, until 1997).
- Establishing a central radioactive waste disposal site in the Siwaqa area to collect radioactive waste from institutions that use radioactive materials, obtaining the Agency's approval to support a project for encapsulating this waste, and supporting institutions in establishing their own radioactive waste collection centres.
- Establishing the national network project for monitoring radioactive materials entering through borders and airports, to prevent the illegal smuggling of radioactive materials and to control the radiation exposure of workers at crossing points.
- Establishing 36 national nuclear projects in various fields (energy, agriculture, industry, medicine, scientific research, environment, water...) and taking part in a similar number of regional projects. International support for them amounted to 22 million dollars, ranging from 57,000 dollars (for a project to develop radiation medicine) to 2.4 million dollars (for the nuclear reactor project). According to the Agency's 1996 technical cooperation report, we were the country receiving the most support from the Agency, the third country in the Agency's history to receive its support for building a nuclear reactor, and the second-best country in terms of reactor type (after Romania). We also took the initiative in establishing many pioneering projects, including the environmental radiation monitoring project and the early warning network for nuclear accidents (which I had the honour of founding and leading), which the Agency adopted and whose idea it disseminated to the countries of the region. The sectoral distribution of the most important of these projects is as follows:
Sectoral distribution of the nuclear projects implemented in 1980–1997 (sector: number of projects)
- Energy (electricity and nuclear fuel): 4
- Medicine and pharmacy: 10
- Protection, security and environmental preservation: 16
- Agriculture and livestock: 10
- Water: 3
- Industry: 3
- Maintenance and calibration: 3
- Basic scientific research: 2
- Multiple sectors: 2
Source: Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources, national paper on the occasion of the visit of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to Jordan, 2007.
The second stage: from 1997 to 2007
This stage saw a number of changes that amounted to a regression in the organisational and functional structure of the nuclear energy administration. The most important were:
- Limiting work to the projects and services that existed in the first stage, and slowing the establishment of new projects.
- Abolishing the independence of the Radiation Protection Board established under Nuclear Energy Law No. 14 of 1987. This abolition is truly a step backwards, especially in the nuclear field, which requires strengthening the separation between the responsibilities of "regulation" and "operation" in nuclear facilities, not merging them in a single body.
- Focusing on income-generating activities (such as training, licensing, border control and irradiating research samples) at the expense of projects aimed at nuclear entry.
- The departure of more than 20 people with specialised, advanced training in various fields of nuclear energy, out of nearly 40 employees who worked at the Commission.
- Abolishing some important sections, such as the Nuclear Agriculture Section, which was the most important section in the Directorate given the importance of using nuclear energy in agriculture and in maximising plant and animal production, and transferring its staff, recognised internationally and in the Arab world for their competence, to other institutions (such as Al-Bashir Hospital).
- Abandoning a number of important projects that formed the second step towards entering the nuclear age after the preceding foundational stage, most importantly the research nuclear reactor project; the uranium project in both its conventional and secondary (phosphate) forms; and the medical gamma irradiator project, which the government had decided to establish with support from the International Atomic Energy Agency (I had the honour of preparing its feasibility study in 1996).
The third stage: from 2008 to the present
This is the situation we have analysed in the series of articles "Approaches to Nuclear Energy". In truth, this stage (in complete contrast to the second) turned towards major projects (or, more precisely, huge ideas). The most important events of this stage were:
- Establishing the Energy Resources Company to take charge of the uranium project, taking over the role of the uranium project management and of the Natural Resources Authority in exploring for nuclear materials and uranium, and legally sanctioning this approach (even though it eliminates the role of a long-established institution founded 40 years ago, which has experience, capabilities and laboratories that cannot be replicated locally or replaced by international companies).
- Repealing Nuclear Energy Law No. 29 of 2001 and issuing Nuclear Energy Law No. 42 of 2007 and Radiation Protection Law No. 43 of 2007.
- Repealing the latest nuclear energy law (only two months after its constitutional approval) to justify establishing a high commission for nuclear energy under the name "Atomic Energy Commission" instead of "Nuclear Energy Commission". This rapid change in the law also raises the question of whether it was due to some interest, or to a mistake that required this sudden change. And why would such a mistake happen? Is legislation that requires constitutional procedures (official approvals, a Royal Decree, etc.) really handled to this extent?
- Using non-specialised and unqualified personnel, especially in influential positions, and excluding some of those with seniority and pioneering experience in nuclear work, including the former Director of Nuclear Energy and the Director of the Uranium Project.
- Creating a new structure for nuclear energy comprising four commissioners (on the salary of a secretary general), a chief commissioner (on a minister's salary), and three companies (the Energy Resources Company, the Nuclear Power Plants Company and the Nuclear Safety Authority), each headed by a director general (on a director general's salary), without clear justification.
In truth, this organisational structure is very inflated and consumes resources. In the first stage, the Nuclear Energy Directorate performed the role described above with a small number of staff and a simple structure, and it achieved a productivity of "33 positive units". This means that we were not only working within a long-term development context for entering the nuclear energy era; every dinar we spent from the state treasury for this purpose was matched by direct revenue (external support for projects) of 33 dinars, not to mention the added value and long-term developmental effects in the development sectors. This cannot be achieved under the current approach, in which spending has ballooned and income has vanished, making productivity "negative", quite apart from the effects of the uncertainty and risks we discussed in previous episodes!
As an example: if the 120 million dollars, say, that will be paid for the research nuclear reactor project (over and above the cost at which we would previously have implemented the project, as we showed in the ninth episode) had been allocated to establishing projects supporting the various development sectors (continuing the approach followed in the first stage), 421 development projects could have been established (at the same cost as the projects we implemented in that period, which averaged 285,000 dollars per project), and each of the nine main development sectors (strongly affected by, and strongly affecting, nuclear entry, as listed in the previous table) would have received 47 projects!
Imagine, then, the development that would have been achieved in those sectors had this approach been followed! What if we spent the 500 million dollars that we are told we will pay for the yellowcake mill project? And what would development look like if the tens of billions of dinars said to be going towards building the proposed nuclear power plants and nuclear fuel cycle projects were allocated in this way!
From the above, the following becomes clear to us:
- Nuclear energy did not begin two years ago, as is repeated in the media. There is an integrated, coherent institutional structure (legislation, buildings, laboratories, manpower, institutions, an organisational structure and a carefully prepared working methodology) built over three decades, on which the state spent large sums.
- All the projects currently announced are a continuation (but a greatly inflated one) of earlier (rationalised) projects dating back to the first stage, and nothing unexpected has happened that requires changing them.
- Work in the field of nuclear energy requires setting aside personal calculations, taking into account the scarcity of specialised and experienced manpower, limited resources, the many complex uncertainty factors, and the danger of the field of work, as we explained in the previous episode.
- Changing administrations is sometimes natural. What is not natural, and cannot be justified in any way, is failing to build cumulatively and creating the illusion that nothing had been done before.
- The correct measure of success for any approach to entering the nuclear age in a small developing country like ours (which suffers from a permanent balance-of-payments deficit and a large debt exceeding 10 billion dinars, and needs to improve its means of production and maximise local revenues) requires focusing on small sectoral development projects, not dangerous astronomical projects that leave us living in fear of losses and risks: material, health, environmental and security...!
- Likewise, focusing on applied projects that generate quick and substantial income (such as the agricultural mutation and pest control projects...) is a better choice for poor countries than delving deep into research in basic sciences, in which the world moved on decades ago (though without neglecting them, of course). This is the approach we were following, and it led to many considerable successes.
Finally: this is the tenth and final episode of the series "Approaches to Nuclear Energy". In truth, there is much more that could be said, but I am certain that this much has served its purpose: for decision-makers; for interested and concerned officials, so that they may grasp the background of the subject and its various aspects; for ordinary citizens who follow such news with keen interest on satellite channels and in the newspapers; and even for broadcasters and commentators, so that they know enough about the subject to prepare a successful and useful programme worthy of us when people abroad are listening; and so that it does not become a shortcoming of our media that a young man or woman who is not a specialist takes on the discussion of these ideas with any official speaking on the subject, without knowing to what extent what is being said reflects what the speaker wants to convey to the public. Jordan deserves it!