
Approaches to Nuclear Energy
- Published:
- April 20, 2010
- Reading time:
- 19 min read
- Category:
- Essay
Episode 8, "Development and Progress Considerations", examines the development requirements of major nuclear programmes, the availability of large-scale investment, and the announced implementation timeline.
Published in Jordan's Al-Sabeel newspaper on 20 April 2010.
Nuclear energy programmes are distinguished by their need for very high standards of quality and precision, and for large investments in three types of projects and infrastructure:
Type one: Projects at the centre or core of the nuclear programme
These are the main projects targeted for investment. In the case of our much-vaunted project, they include:
- Four nuclear power plants of 1,000 megawatts each, perhaps more or fewer (because of the uncertainty and the conflicting information reported by the media).
- A nuclear fuel enrichment plant, which, as we explained in the previous episode, would comprise tens of thousands of centrifuges and might require its own power plant because of how much energy and electricity it consumes.
Type two: Projects complementary to the core projects
These are not secondary works but essential projects without which type-one projects cannot proceed. In many cases they must be built and equipped long before type-one projects begin, so that they can be tested and their effectiveness verified, and then developed over time. In the case of our project, they include the following main components:
- A programme of exploration for uranium from both its conventional and phosphate sources, covering all Jordanian territory, including advanced measuring instruments and laboratories, exploration teams, vehicles and machinery, and sometimes even aircraft.
- A plant for extracting uranium from phosphate, with the other production lines it requires, such as the production of phosphoric acid and the industrial materials derived from this industry.
- A plant for producing yellowcake (the first raw material in the nuclear fuel cycle). Several such plants may be needed if uranium is exploited by several companies at multiple, widely separated sites in the Kingdom.
- A plant for producing uranium dioxide from yellowcake, used in manufacturing unenriched nuclear fuel.
- A plant for converting uranium dioxide into uranium hexafluoride gas, the raw material for the enrichment process.
- Facilities for nuclear and radioactive materials (unused materials, such as fresh fuel) at the sites of nuclear facilities and at entry points and borders, and a central facility for storing surplus and reserve stocks of these materials and of yellowcake.
- Facilities for storing radioactive waste at the reactor sites; a central facility for collecting, refining, treating, melting, mixing, encapsulating and preparing waste for burial; and a central underground repository for it in an area with special specifications.
- A nuclear material accountancy authority with enough strength and equipment to guarantee full control over all the centres mentioned above and their facilities.
- A radiation monitoring system for people working in the project's main and supporting components, and in other places, according to a defined system that takes into account geographical distance, the prevailing climate, water and food sources, and so on.
- A network for environmental radiation monitoring and early warning of nuclear accidents covering all Jordanian territory, equipped with fixed and mobile stations for measuring radioactive dust, and laboratories spread across the main cities, around nuclear facilities, and at selected sites that may be more exposed to accidents and radioactive fallout (or dust).
- A strong regulatory authority responsible for licensing and inspecting the institutions and personnel working in the project, to ensure that radiation exposure is kept within internationally permitted levels (!).
- An institute (or more) for university education, at least at bachelor's and master's levels, with a reactor and laboratories in all fields of engineering and science; centres for practical and field training at work sites; continuous external training programmes at various university levels for hundreds of people who will work in the projects; and advanced post-master's training programmes for 300–600 of the required staff, lasting 48–60 months for each person in this category, which forms the heart of the work in the project.
Type three: Supporting projects
These are non-nuclear investments and projects in all development sectors of the country concerned. They form the strong framework (or backbone) that supports the projects of the nuclear complex and holds them together so that they work in harmony to achieve its goals. The most important of these sectors are the following:
- Industry: This sector must be strong enough to supply some of the materials, equipment and spare parts and to carry out maintenance work for the project, at least at a minimum level, to ensure that serious consequences do not arise from delays in maintenance if it is to be carried out by foreign companies. This seems difficult to achieve, not only because of the weakness of the industrial sector in Jordan, but also for reasons related to two factors: uncertainty and low reliability.
To clarify what is meant by these two factors: a country may be able to manufacture a pressure vessel used outside nuclear reactors, yet it will refrain from carrying out a simple weld on a small crack in a similar vessel in a nuclear reactor, out of fear that any small error, perhaps not visible even with the most precise detection instruments, could lead to a devastating accident!
This concern drives countries to sign maintenance and parts-supply contracts with the manufacturer for the entire life of the reactor, over fifty years, at prices set by the company!
To overcome this problem, countries are keen to build their first reactor on a turnkey basis and then gradually begin manufacturing the components of their subsequent reactors, from the simplest to the most complex, until they reach a suitable level of self-sufficiency in maintenance and parts manufacturing. Because this is difficult to achieve in our case, the project will remain a drain on financial resources; its feasibility may weaken, and it may lose its justification as an alternative energy option.
- Primary energy sources: The availability of uranium in suitable quantities and at suitable prices supports the building of nuclear reactors. However, this advantage loses part of its importance in non-industrialised countries, where there is no capacity to manufacture fuel locally, forcing them to sell their yellowcake output (like any commodity unrelated to nuclear energy projects) at low prices compared with the price of manufactured fuel. That is one side.
On the other side, uranium sources in Jordan are still under study and evaluation, and producing uranium from them may not prove feasible. The price of uranium on the international market may also change, for example because of intense competition between uranium-producing countries; the reduction of nuclear warheads and the recycling of their enriched uranium as fuel for nuclear reactors; the global trend towards using low-enriched uranium; and the tendency of some countries to dispose of their plutonium stockpiles. These may result in a large surplus of fissile material being put on the world market, affecting uranium prices and therefore the feasibility of producing it in areas where uranium concentrations in the rocks are low, as in Jordan. All this means that we cannot be certain to what extent we can rely on local uranium sources in deciding in advance on the number and size of the nuclear reactors we wish to acquire.
- The electricity grid: The local grid must be large and stable enough to absorb the energy that the large nuclear power plants will generate within the base load. This condition is not met by the national grid, as we explained in a previous episode. The same applies to transmission lines, distribution and transformer stations, and control centres, which must also be able to absorb the new developments and loads. This infrastructure might be built, but the decisive factors are the size of the investment and the time needed for implementation, given the great uncertainty about the project's implementation: Will it be implemented in full, or only in part? How large would that part be? And when?
- Water sources: Providing the water needed to produce nuclear fuel and to cool nuclear power plants is a major concern, especially in countries in arid and semi-arid regions such as Jordan. Producing 2,000 tonnes of yellowcake, for example, consumes about 2 million cubic metres of water every year. The problem becomes more complicated if many international companies take part in uranium exploration and each wishes to own its own yellowcake plant, because of differing interests or because the uranium ore extraction sites are far apart across the Kingdom.
The important question here is: What would happen if the water basins were non-renewable? What would happen if these basins dried up or were depleted? How would the project affect the water basins through radioactive contamination? Which is more beneficial: using water sources for these projects, which involve radioactive contamination, or saving them for more pressing purposes such as drinking and agriculture? Can we guarantee that there will be no conflict with the needs of the region's countries that draw on the same water basins, and thus guarantee that they will not object? What price would be demanded in each case, throughout the life of the project (an indefinite period)? And what would be the effect of fluctuating, and often conflicting, interests on the project's feasibility at its outset and on its continued operation after commissioning?
In addition, nuclear power plants consume large quantities of water for cooling, which is best supplied from open seas and from running water sources such as rivers with a flow rate of no less than 110 cubic metres per hour. These are not available in Jordan, as we explained in the sixth episode. In Jordan, the means said to be planned for supplying reactor cooling water include the following:
- A closed cooling system: Cooling water is recirculated and reused to reduce the amount of water lost. Although this option is practically possible, it (contrary to what is said) requires considerable amounts of water, given the large number and size of the reactors and the prevailing environmental conditions and climate (hot weather and drought).
- The Two Seas Canal: This canal is planned to convey water from the Gulf of Aqaba to the Dead Sea. The problem with this option is that it is still not guaranteed, and the volume of cooling water needed for the nuclear power plants may be greater than the amount of water that would flow in the canal, if it is built. Add to this the harmful effects of the radioactive and thermal pollution that would result from using this canal's water on the Jordan Valley (Al-Aghwar), which, as we know, is an enclosed area surrounded by mountains, naturally hot, and our food basket in summer and winter.
The water issue is one of the most sensitive in Jordan, and building such a huge nuclear programme would deepen this problem. We do not know whether our groundwater reserves will meet our growing needs for industry, agriculture and domestic use, so what if we used them on this scale and with this intensity for the purposes of this huge nuclear programme? Another assumption that seems extremely optimistic is using nuclear plants for desalination to meet our need for drinking water. Logic dictates that conserving our assured groundwater, especially the non-renewable part of it, is better for us than building a huge, water-consuming nuclear programme with uncertain results; and that paying thousands of dinars to drill an artesian well from which we can quench our thirst (!) is more worthwhile than spending billions of dinars on building nuclear plants for desalination, an option that has failed all over the world, as we showed in the fifth episode!
- Executive administrations: Implementing the nuclear project requires establishing a number of advanced administrations, including: (a) several bodies to follow up the projects of the nuclear complex (each according to its specialisation), operating throughout the study and implementation phases of each component of the project, bearing in mind that the tasks of these bodies differ from one project to another and from one year to another because of the diversity of the projects, which makes the work more difficult and raises costs; (b) numerous bodies (international companies) to supervise the implementation of the projects of the nuclear complex; and (c) qualified companies to manage and maintain each component of the project. In fact, these structures are very costly. Apart from international expertise, they must be established and tested long before the start of the project or projects concerned, which cannot be achieved with the required competence before work begins in each case.
- The environment: Under normal operating conditions, the environmental sector is affected by, and strongly affects, the components of the nuclear project. This requires many preparations and facilities to deal with the issue under normal operating conditions. The strength of this mutual effect increases as the project's components increase in type and size, and here geography comes strongly into play (as we explained in the sixth episode). Under accident conditions, the matter is even more dangerous because of the number and size of the projects. The probability of a devastating accident at a nuclear reactor, for example, is less than 1 in 20,000 per reactor-year of operation, a low figure that is easy to deal with under the international principle of justification. But this figure becomes considerable (1 in 60) when we are talking about a large project consisting of one research reactor and 3–4 nuclear power plants, each with two units or reactors; about a crowded project with many components; and about a region that has been continuously unstable since the dawn of history.
- Security: This sector includes all security forces, including the army, civil defence, the gendarmerie and other security forces. A huge project requires preparations and equipment, even military facilities and bases, and central emergency and rescue teams at every project site and in the governorates and main cities, equipped with radiation measuring instruments and with the materials, equipment and vehicles needed to carry out rescue, evacuation and first-aid operations and to provide food, drink, clothing, blankets, tents and so on. It also requires a national, regional and international security umbrella for nuclear materials, equipped with the latest and most effective means of defence, protection, communication and intelligence, and a national network for monitoring main roads, borders and airports, equipped with suitable measuring instruments.
- Transport and communications: In addition to a good road network, large nuclear programmes need a special network of land, sea and air transport, including railways and private aircraft. What makes these requirements more difficult is the number, diversity and size of the nuclear project's components, which, for security and logistical reasons, are usually built far apart from one another, and the need for strict security control, which often requires the use of dedicated roads, means of transport, ports and airports.
- Finance and business: As an initial estimate, the central components of the project (the nuclear power plants) require about 5–10 billion dinars per nuclear plant, and the supporting nuclear projects in the nuclear complex may also cost no less than 10 billion, given that a simple yellowcake plant could cost 600 million dollars (as announced in the media). Added to this is the cost of developing the sectors that strongly affect the project (type-three projects), which is difficult to estimate at present.
This means that we are heading into a project that could cost 20–40 billion dinars (in capital costs alone), spread over 20 years, the target period for implementing the project. In other words, we would have to bear 1–2 billion a year, in addition to the cost of capital, which is expected to be no less than 10–15% a year because of the absence of infrastructure and the weak certainty factor (in a similar programme, Britain raised the discount rate by 2.5 points above the figure used in feasibility calculations for non-nuclear projects, bringing it to 9%).
The question that arises here concerns the mechanism for securing these sums, the costs of loans, repayment guarantees, insurance and so on, and how to handle them in banking terms; the need for a strong, advanced banking system and high credit ratings; and many other matters whose consequences are difficult to predict over the project's assumed 20-year lifetime and beyond, into the operating period, until the costs are fully repaid!
The problem here, in addition to the above, is that many of the costs of type-three projects, and a large part of type-two projects, are not taken into account in the feasibility studies for type-one projects. Herein lies the danger: that the nuclear programme as a whole becomes the kind that brings losses instead of reaping profits!
This shows how deep the gap is between purely theoretical estimates and actual need, and between ambition and reality.
The issue cannot be reduced (as is repeated in the media) to training hundreds of engineers, for example, to run the project, or to establishing the nucleus of an authority here and another there, or even to obtaining promises of investment from major international companies. The question is: to what extent can we, as a country, within a few years, provide these huge investments and build a strong, coherent infrastructure on the scale this project requires, a burden that would weigh down even a group of nations? And to what extent can we, in such a short time and by every development measure, build an advanced state of "in-depth quality culture", in nuclear terminology, that enables us to deal with a project of this size and sensitivity and to sustain it, so that we reap its great benefits and avoid its grave dangers, whether those relating to the direct nuclear hazard or to the adverse knock-on effects on the various development sectors? To clarify, a project of this size would, in the absence of a comprehensive vision, become a burden obstructing development at every level, not only for the projects of the nuclear complex.
To appreciate the scale of the contrast, consider for comparison the case of Italy, which recently decided to produce 25% of its electricity from nuclear energy by 2030. In its general framework, this case is entirely similar to the situation proposed for Jordan, but when we compare the necessary infrastructure and economic indicators of the two countries, we find a great difference between them. As an indicator of the nuclear complex's infrastructure, Italy is one of the best industrialised countries in the world, and in the nuclear field specifically it has long accumulated experience amounting to 200 reactor-years, including the construction and operation of 5 nuclear research reactors and 4 nuclear power plants (closed after the Chernobyl accident in 1986 for safety reasons and under pressure from environmental groups).
As indicators of development and progress, Italy has a population of 60 million (10 times Jordan's population); it was the world's seventh-largest economy before the economic crisis (and the 11th after it); its gross domestic product is about 2 trillion dollars (60 times Jordan's GDP); its per capita income is 30,000 dollars a year (17 times that of Jordan); and its electricity grid capacity is about 100,000 megawatts (40 times the Jordanian grid)! It imports 15% of its electricity, which means that 15% of the capacity of its planned plants will go to covering this deficit, and the remaining part (10%) will be used within the base load of its electricity grid (which is the natural approach we have always explained and defended).
Thus we see that all development and progress considerations work in favour of the nuclear option in Italy within the general framework mentioned (producing 25% of electricity from nuclear energy by 2030), while the very same considerations work against this option in Jordan (within the same framework)!
Finally, we hope to have a successful nuclear project, and it would be a source of personal pride to me (since I founded nuclear energy in Jordan, was the first to manage it, and still follow it with great passion). But talk of a project of this magnitude, all at once, in a small, non-industrialised country with limited resources and scarce water, and within a record time (only 20 years), involves a great degree of uncertainty that harms the project's economics, and many great hazards and risks that press strongly for reconsidering the idea from its foundations.