
Approaches to Nuclear Energy
- Published:
- March 7, 2010
- Reading time:
- 4 min read
- Category:
- Essay
Episode 4, "Scale and Alternatives Considerations", examines the proposed project's scale in light of international radiation protection principles and promising national energy alternatives.
Published in Jordan's Al-Sabeel newspaper on 7 March 2010.
Nuclear projects are subject to three basic international principles. The first is the "principle of justification": the project must achieve real gains (its benefits must outweigh its harms), and there must be no other, non-nuclear option that could serve the same purpose. The second is the "principle of dose limitation": the radiation doses received by the project's workers and by members of the public must not exceed predetermined limits, to ensure that no immediate or delayed health effects occur. The third is the "principle of optimisation": everything necessary (in effort, money and time) must be done to achieve the best standards of radiation protection in the project and all its associated activities, taking into account all economic and social factors. We addressed this issue last time.
These principles are taken into account in the feasibility study, in environmental studies, in the design, during the construction and operation of the project, and in the licensing procedures for each of these stages. This means that proving the economic feasibility of any nuclear project does not mean that the project has become "justified" under the international principles. Other conditions must also be met: the absence of non-radiation or non-nuclear alternatives, the optimisation of protection, and the limitation of doses, all of which require costs and prior studies.
Implementing a project of this size in a country like Jordan, even if we set aside the thorny issue of optimisation, not only contradicts the principle of "justification" mentioned above, but also restricts, or even nearly eliminates, any thought of another option, even if it is viable, and perhaps more viable. This is because we will not be able to consider developing any other, non-nuclear energy source as long as we have a large energy surplus that could lose its market at any moment if other countries stop importing energy from Jordan. That is, unless we assume that those countries will keep waiting to import energy, and more energy, from us at the price we want. This assumption is even more extravagantly optimistic than the "export" assumption used to justify the project; indeed, it takes it even further from reality.
The approach followed in all countries of the world, developing and industrialised alike, and the one that should be followed in Jordan's case, is to develop a national basket of primary energy sources that includes all available sources, including nuclear energy at a reasonable capacity if studies show it to be viable, and in light of the international principles of nuclear work mentioned above. If these alternatives combined, which should be designed primarily to achieve self-sufficiency, produce energy that the national grid cannot absorb because of an imbalance in the load factor, the surplus is fed into the regional grid as exported energy.
But to design the grid's installed capacity from the outset for the purpose of export, and to impose nuclear power plants as an inevitable choice, is a dangerous option, especially since, as we showed on a previous occasion, the cost of producing energy in Jordan is higher than in neighbouring countries! Moreover, we have plenty of local alternative energy sources, such as oil shale, whose reserves in Jordan are estimated at about 40–60 billion tonnes and could produce enough oil to meet our needs for nearly 600 years, as well as inexhaustible solar and wind energy!