
Approaches to Nuclear Energy
- Published:
- April 4, 2010
- Reading time:
- 6 min read
- Category:
- Essay
Episode 7, "Uranium and Nuclear Fuel Considerations", examines claims about the possibility of establishing a Jordanian nuclear fuel production plant and enriching uranium locally.
Published in Jordan's Al-Sabeel newspaper on 4 April 2010.
The subject of uranium and nuclear fuel has been discussed no less than other nuclear energy topics in local and international media and in scientific and specialist forums. In truth, much of what was said, in the form of proposals or media statements, was confusing, obstructed the work, and was out of context on many pivotal and decisive issues. I say this not merely as someone who witnessed the uranium file from beginning to end, but as someone who worked on it and lived with it without interruption, by virtue of my position and specialisation, from the first paper I wrote on it about 30 years ago until my retirement in 2006.
At the outset, in 1985, I prepared a study on Jordanian uranium, which was adopted by the government and the International Atomic Energy Agency and culminated in the establishment of two uranium projects in the period 1988–1990, with financial and scientific support from the Agency:
The first project: Extracting uranium from phosphate ore
This project successfully achieved the following objectives:
- Establishing a pilot plant in Jordan to produce the raw material for nuclear fuel, known as yellowcake.
- Testing extraction methods locally. We succeeded in developing a method for extracting nearly 90% of the uranium content of Jordanian phosphate using simple, accessible techniques.
- Beginning preparations for the commercial production stage for about 100,000 tonnes of uranium contained in phosphate, which goes to waste every year with the phosphate exported abroad!
The second project: Exploring for conventional uranium
This project and its later developments resulted in the following:
- Identifying the areas where uranium occurs in the Kingdom, at six main sites.
- Estimating the reserves of this type of uranium in the Siwaqa area alone at about 60,000 tonnes, of which 24,000 tonnes are of relatively high grade and could be exploited if energy prices rise.
- Drawing up a plan to explore for uranium in other areas, for which the government allocated one million dinars in 2007 alone.
- Drawing up a plan to produce 2,000 tonnes of yellowcake per year from the central region of the Kingdom.
- Attracting international interest in this resource, which culminated in the project being awarded to an international company shortly before my retirement in 2008.
Finally, the media, including international outlets, reported some time ago that we would produce the enriched uranium our reactors need ourselves... Here we must pause and examine the subject of uranium enrichment carefully!
Enrichment, the process of raising the proportion of uranium-235 in nuclear fuel, is carried out by three methods, the most widespread being the centrifuge method, perhaps because it is the easiest and most productive. Ease, however, is not the only criterion for choosing this method or another. There are many other considerations, the most important of which is, of course, obtaining the necessary technologies: from where? How? And at what price?
The industrialised countries that own these technologies do not allow enrichment technology to leak even to their closest friends, for reasons we all know; otherwise, the world would be at the mercy of the fierce winds of nuclear weapons manufacturing! I am 100% certain that no country will export to us, or to any other country, any of the known enrichment technologies.
In the 1990s, on our own initiative, we established an Arab project to use lasers for uranium enrichment, with support from the Arab Atomic Energy Agency; it was meant to be based in Jordan, but it was halted. Any attempt to resume such work will be futile, for one simple reason: "global security!" That is one side. On the other side, even if we were allowed to acquire such technologies, a flood of questions would remain unanswered, such as:
- How much would we pay the companies or countries that supply them to us? And what effect would that have on the feasibility of the whole project and on the economics of the nuclear power plants we wish to build?
- How much would it cost us to produce a limited quantity of enriched uranium for local use by extremely energy-intensive methods, such as the centrifuge method, which needs tens of thousands of centrifuges running day and night, all year round, for many years, consuming large amounts of electricity to produce a quantity of low-enriched uranium?
- Would we build the enrichment project only to produce our own fuel, and then stop the centrifuges once our needs were met? Or would we contract with other countries to sell them the surplus enriched fuel? In that case, do we have a vision for the nuclear fuel trade, a sensitive commodity subject not only to market conditions of quality, supply and demand, but also to highly volatile and turbulent political considerations, and to discouraging speculation? For those who do not know, there is an unseen movement in the world that speculates on nuclear fuel prices to prevent countries from developing their own sources.
From the above, it is clear that the announced desire to enrich uranium is an excessively optimistic ambition, not to say an unfounded one. There is no better evidence of this than the fact that only a very small number of countries, no more than the fingers of one hand, enrich uranium themselves. It is a form of scientific luxury that even major countries avoid because of its exorbitant capital and running costs! Enrichment succeeds only if the following conditions are met: 1) possessing one's own scientific and industrial capabilities (as a basic condition in all cases, together with one or both of the following conditions); 2) having a large international market for exporting the enriched uranium produced beyond local needs; 3) producing the enriched uranium needed for military programmes oneself. None of these is available to Jordan!
Finally, the repetition of these ideas and assumptions in scientific forums and the media, as a justification for the announced Jordanian nuclear project, as one of its pillars, or as one of the reasons for its success, prompts us to ask: Has the idea been fully studied and scrutinised? Does talk about it reflect knowledge of the technical difficulties inherent in it? And does it reflect an appreciation of the international position on it? We do not think so... though we wish it were so!