This interview was originally conducted in Arabic. The following is an English translation of the transcript.

In the name of God, and praise be to God, and may peace and blessings be upon the Messenger of God. First of all, I would like to thank you very much for this visit, and I would also like to thank Roya TV for taking an interest in this important subject. As you know, what we are witnessing now is, in a sense, an indirect nuclear war. For the first time in history, the military targeting of nuclear facilities—whether peaceful or otherwise—is being openly discussed and carried out. This is an extremely unusual and disturbing development, but it has happened. Destroying nuclear facilities, bombing them, or attempting to disable a nuclear program is different from the usual scenarios associated with warfare. In wartime, reactor cores, active nuclear materials, and radioactive substances are generally secured in protected locations. Therefore, if buildings or installations are struck, the consequences may not necessarily be as severe as an accident occurring in an operating reactor. In such cases, the radiological impact on the environment and surrounding areas may be significantly lower. However, everything depends on the type of facility being targeted. If, for example, a radioactive-material storage site or a spent-fuel storage facility were struck, the radiological consequences could be extremely serious and could result in dangerous radioactive contamination lasting for thousands of years. We do not know exactly what was targeted; what we know is that nuclear facilities and research centers were struck. Iran’s Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant is operating at a capacity of about 1,000 megawatts. I do not believe it will be targeted, because doing so would be scientifically, ethically, and legally reprehensible. Such an attack could lead to very widespread radioactive contamination, particularly in the area near the Arabian Gulf and in the immediate surroundings of the plant. Other facilities are different. Arak, for example, is associated with heavy water, and striking such a facility would not necessarily create the same level of radiological impact. Nuclear fuel processing facilities, however, can produce very serious radioactive contamination, as can storage sites containing spent fuel removed from reactors. Uranium enrichment, on the other hand, does not usually produce contamination on the same scale, although the materials involved are radioactive. Their radioactive lifetimes vary greatly, from billions of years in the case of uranium to very short-lived isotopes whose half-lives may be measured in minutes or seconds. If such facilities are struck, some radioactive elements may be released into the environment. That is with regard to Iran. The same principle applies to Israel, although the effect on us as a country depends largely on proximity. This issue came up during the discussion, and I mentioned this point. If the question is whether radioactive materials used in warfare have the same effect as peaceful nuclear facilities that are attacked, the answer is that the situations are different. A wide range of radioactive and nuclear materials can be used in warfare, including fission bombs, hydrogen bombs, neutron bombs, dirty bombs, and depleted uranium. Depleted uranium is used in armor and in certain missile and military applications because it is dense and hard, and it can also be used in armored protection. Nuclear facilities are different from ordinary military facilities, and the consequences depend on whether the material is intended for use as a weapon, is part of a nuclear installation, or is being stored. As we have said, there is a major distinction. A nuclear bomb is designed to destroy through several mechanisms, including an intense thermal wave and a powerful blast wave at the moment of detonation. Depending on the size of the bomb, this blast can destroy buildings within a radius of around two kilometers, with additional effects extending beyond that distance over time. This does not happen in the same way with nuclear reactors. If a reactor is struck, radioactive material may leak into the environment, and the resulting harm is often long-term and not immediately perceptible. People very close to the reactor may suffer severe injuries or fatalities. The number could be 10, 15, 20, 30, or even 100 to 200 people, depending on the type of reactor and the scale of the accident. But radioactive contamination can spread very widely if a major facility such as Bushehr is hit, potentially increasing radiation levels across broad regions, as happened after the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. The effects may take the form of indirect illnesses that emerge later, including delayed cancers and congenital abnormalities affecting fetuses and children. Those who die from direct radiation burns are usually fewer in number, although that depends entirely on the type and severity of the accident and the facility involved. Radiation burns are different from thermal burns. At sufficiently high levels of exposure, radiation itself can damage and burn body tissue. As for the wider environment, if a nuclear facility is struck or a nuclear weapon is detonated, radioactive contamination may spread across areas of varying size depending on the power of the explosion, the type and size of the reactor, and the nature of the event. The affected area can be divided into several zones. The first zone may extend roughly 15 to 20 kilometers. In the Fukushima accident in Japan, areas close to the plant were completely evacuated. A second zone may extend to around 30 kilometers, where authorities impose strict controls over movement and food consumption. Farther away, restrictions may become progressively lighter as radiation levels decrease with distance. Depending on the nature of the accident and prevailing weather conditions, the effects may extend much farther. If the Bushehr plant were operating and came under attack, we could expect radioactive material to spread over a very wide area in varying concentrations. Areas very close to the plant would be the most dangerous, while more distant regions might be subject to controls on movement, food, and daily life. These restrictions would generally become less severe with increasing distance. Radiation does not disappear suddenly. Its levels decrease gradually, and even distant areas may experience slight increases in background radiation. The impact depends on the type of radioactive material and the nature of the accident. Depleted uranium, for example, is what remains after enrichment, once part of the uranium-235 has been separated. Some uranium isotopes have extremely long half-lives, around 4.5 billion years. This means that such material can remain in the environment for immense periods of time. If it burns or disperses into the environment, it can pose both chemical and radiological toxicity. In terms of risk, some materials are short-lived but highly radioactive, while others have very long half-lives and persist in the environment for extremely long periods. Each presents a different type of hazard. There are two main categories of illness caused by radiation exposure. The first is an acute form, which occurs when the dose exceeds a certain threshold. The second is delayed illness, such as certain cancers, which may appear after exposure to much lower doses over a longer period of time. Some effects may also involve risks to fetuses or future generations, depending on the nature and level of exposure. Pregnant women and children are certainly among the most vulnerable groups, because their bodies are still undergoing growth and rapid cell division. As a result, some organs and tissues may be more sensitive to radiation. We hope matters never reach the point where nuclear facilities are deliberately targeted, because the resulting environmental damage may persist for a very long time. Contamination spreads through the air, water, and food. Airborne radioactive material can travel varying distances depending on the nature of the accident, wind direction, and weather conditions. Radiation does not simply vanish. Its intensity declines gradually, and contamination may extend across tens or even hundreds of kilometers depending on the scale of the event. The problem is that contamination does not spread through the air alone. It can also move through water and cross borders through the import and export of contaminated food and materials. Necessary protective measures include tighter border controls, monitoring imports and exports, and conducting radiological inspections of materials arriving from areas close to an accident. If a radiological accident occurs and is officially confirmed, health authorities may recommend the use of iodine tablets under specific circumstances, especially for vulnerable groups and only under medical and official supervision. The purpose is to reduce the thyroid gland’s uptake of radioactive iodine when there is a confirmed risk of exposure. Depending on the nature of the accident and the instructions of the relevant authorities, people may also be advised to rely temporarily on canned or packaged food and avoid certain fresh foods if there is a possibility of contamination. Before all of that, however, reason and restraint must prevail, and the international community should reject any action that leads to the targeting of nuclear facilities, because the resulting environmental consequences may be long-lasting. As for masks, are they useful? They may provide some protection in cases where contamination is airborne and relatively light, but contamination is not limited to the air. We may be affected by any major radiological accident occurring nearby, depending on distance, prevailing winds, atmospheric pressure differences, and vertical and horizontal air movement. If a major accident were to occur at the Bushehr plant in Iran, Gulf countries could be affected to varying degrees, which would require continuous radiation monitoring. In Jordan, we established an emergency plan in 1986 immediately after the Chernobyl accident, and we launched an environmental radiation monitoring project that was later adopted by several Arab countries, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia. We then established an environmental radiation monitoring network consisting of stations designed to detect radiation crossing national borders in various governorates. It was a highly effective network during my time at the Nuclear Energy Directorate. I left that position some time ago and do not know its current status, but we hope it remains operational and under continuous monitoring. In 1986, following the Chernobyl accident, the Nuclear Energy Directorate at the Ministry of Energy called for an Arab meeting in Amman to assess the situation. That meeting resulted in a regional radiation-monitoring project covering a number of sites in Jordan and dozens of sites in Egypt. Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Iran later joined the initiative. An automated early-warning network was subsequently established to detect the entry of radioactive material into the Kingdom. As a historical example of monitoring, during certain military events in the region, our network detected small amounts of radioactive substances, including radioactive iodine, in a limited number of samples. Because some of these isotopes have short half-lives, they decay relatively quickly. These networks and monitoring projects were later expanded to a broader regional and international level, strengthening our ability to detect any external radioactive contamination entering Jordan’s environment. We hope these systems continue to operate efficiently and that the specialized teams responsible for them continue their monitoring efforts.